Russia has now demonstrated both the capacity of its conventional military capabilities and willingness to use them. This transformation and the accompanying rearmament programme are continuing, and the Russian military is benefiting from ongoing ‘training’ under real operational conditions in Ukraine and Syria. The most visible demonstration of this has been the unprecedented near-total transformation of Russia’s armed forces since 2008. In both of these fields, Russia’s capabilities have developed rapidly in recent years to match its persistent intentions. Two specific tools for exercising Russian power demand close study: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the state’s capacity for information warfare. Today, as in the past, Western planners and policy-makers must consider and plan not only for the potential threat of military attack by Russia, but also for the actual threat of Moscow’s ongoing subversion, destabilization and ‘active measures’. As a result, despite modern technological enablers, Russia’s intentions and actions throughout the Ukraine conflict have been recognizable from previous decades of study of the threat to the West from the Soviet Union.
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Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s military academics have displayed an unbroken and consistently developing train of thought on the changing nature of conflict and how to prevail in it, including – but certainly not limited to – the successful application of military power. Nevertheless, the techniques and methods displayed by Russia in Ukraine have roots in traditional Soviet approaches. The widespread adoption of phrases such as ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ reinforced this perception of novelty, and was indicative of a search for ways to conceptualize – and make sense of – a Russian approach to conflict that the West found at first sight unfamiliar. The distinctive Russian approach to operations in Ukraine gave rise to an impression among some observers that its military had employed fundamentally new concepts of armed conflict. The capabilities it employed to do so surprised the West, despite being well advertised in advance and their development described in detail by the Russia-watching community in Western nations. In the last two years, Russia has demonstrated its return to an assertive foreign policy by successful military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. NATO’s policy should follow the path of credible and realistic collective efforts in order to be seen as a token of responsibility for protection and defense of the territory and population of the Euro-Atlantic community. All agree that NATO must show political unity and determination to cope effectively with the complex set of security issues and dilemmas. They also point at the need for a reinforcement of NATO’s military capabilities and deterrence potential. Several authors in their contributions to this volume highlight the importance of readiness, reassurance and revitalisation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As a result, NATO has to work out an appropriate response to the problems and challenges piling up within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The economic crisis, defense budget cuts, domestic issues and national problems in member states constitute additional factors weakening unity and identity of the Euro-Atlantic security community. Russia’s aggressive stance at the international stage, the Ukraine crisis, the turmoil in the Middle East are the most notable examples of risks emerging outside the North Atlantic area yet strongly influencing NATO’s policy. This publication offers a wide panorama of issues, problems and challenges confronting NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community in the regional and global contexts.
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